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Nathan Oman
Since the publication of the Book of Mormon in 1830, those subscrib-ing to an environmental explanation have sometimes argued that its 
account of Gadianton robbers and secret combinations is a thinly veiled 
attack on Masonry, reﬂecting the burst of anti-Masonic feeling in New 
York in the last half of the 1820s. Alexander Campbell seems to have 
been the ﬁrst one to advance the anti-Masonic thesis, writing in Febru-
ary 1831.¹ However, Campbell soon rejected his original explanation in 
favor of the Spalding theory, which rapidly became the dominant non-
Mormon explanation for the Book of Mormon in that century.² The anti-
Masonic thesis, however, was revived and deepened in the opening de-
cades of the twentieth century.³ By the time of her famous 1945 biography 
of Joseph Smith, Fawn Brodie was conﬁdently asserting that the Book of 
Mormon’s discussion of secret combinations “were bald parallels of Ma-
sonic oaths.”⁴ Since the publication of No Man Knows My History, the 
 1. See Richard L. Bushman, Joseph Smith and the Beginnings of Mormonism (Ur-
bana: University of Illinois Press, 1984), 125.
 2. See ibid., 231 n. 37 (which states that Campbell accepted the “Spalding-Rigdon 
hypothesis” later in life) and ibid., 127 (which states that the Spalding theory was the 
dominant non–Latter-day Saint explanation of the Book of Mormon in the nineteenth 
century). For a summary of the Spalding theory, see Lester E. Bush Jr., “The Spalding 
Theory Then and Now,” Dialogue 10/4 (1977): 40.
 3. See Walter F. Prince, “Psychological Tests for the Authorship of the Book of Mor-
mon,” American Journal of Psychology 28 (July 1917): 373–89.
 4. Fawn M. Brodie, No Man Knows My History (New York: Knopf, 1945), 65.
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anti-Masonic thesis has become common among non–Latter-day Saint 
writers on Mormonism.⁵ In recent years, Dan Vogel has been its most 
articulate proponent.⁶
Scholars have disputed the thesis. Richard Bushman, Blake Ostler, 
Daniel Peterson, and D. Michael Quinn have been its main critics.⁷ 
The basic thrust of their arguments is that the claimed parallels between 
Masonry and the Gadianton robbers are superﬁcial. Peterson, for ex-
ample, notes that some proponents of the thesis have argued that the 
fact that both Masons and Gadianton robbers wore lambskin aprons 
is signiﬁcant (see 3 Nephi 4:7).⁸ However, he argues that this parallel 
is trivial since there is but a single reference to “lambskins” as Ga-
dianton garb, which has no particular signiﬁcance in the narrative, 
and the Book of Mormon lists other clothing worn by the robbers.⁹ 
 5. See, for example, Thomas F. O’Dea, The Mormons (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1957), 23, 35, 57; Robert N. Hullinger, Mormon Answer to Skepticism: Why 
Joseph Smith Wrote the Book of Mormon (St. Louis: Clayton, 1980), 100–104; David Per-
suitte, Joseph Smith and the Origins of the Book of Mormon (Jeﬀerson, NC: McFarland, 
1985), 174–80.
 6. See Dan Vogel, “Mormonism’s ‘Anti-Masonick Bible,’ ” John Whitmer Historical 
Association Journal 9 (1989): 17–30; Dan Vogel, “Echoes of Anti-Masonry: A Rejoinder 
to the Critics of the Anti-Masonic Thesis,” in American Apocrypha, ed. Dan Vogel and 
Brent Lee Metcalfe (Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 2002), 275–320.
 7. Bushman, Joseph Smith and the Beginnings of Mormonism, 128–31; Blake Ostler, 
“The Book of Mormon as a Modern Expansion of an Ancient Source,” Dialogue 20/1 
(1987): 66, 73–76; Daniel C. Peterson, “Notes on ‘Gadianton Masonry,’ ” in Warfare in the 
Book of Mormon, ed. Stephen D. Ricks and William J. Hamblin (Salt Lake City: Deseret 
Book and FARMS, 1990), 181; D. Michael Quinn, Early Mormonism and the Magic World 
View, 2nd ed. (Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 1997), 202 and 511–12 n. 216. All citations 
in this paper are to this revised edition of Quinn’s book. Quinn takes the anomalous 
position that secret combinations in the Book of Mormon refer to black magic and occult 
murders, or at any rate that they were understood this way by the book’s ﬁrst readers. 
Quinn, Early Mormonism and the Magic World View, 207. However, Quinn’s thesis does 
not seem to have caught on even with environmental critics eager to locate the Book of 
Mormon entirely in a nineteenth-century context. See, for example, Vogel, “Echoes of 
Anti-Masonry,” 276. For a recent discussion, see Paul Mouritsen, “Secret Combinations 
and Flaxen Cords: Anti-Masonic Rhetoric and the Book of Mormon,” Journal of Book of 
Mormon Studies 12/1 (2003): 64–77.
 8. Peterson, “Notes on ‘Gadianton Masonry,’ ” 180.
 9. Ibid., 203. Matthew B. Brown, “Girded About with a Lambskin,” Journal of Book 
of Mormon Studies 6/2 (1997): 124–51, provides a much lengthier treatment of the issue. 
Brown argues that the lambskin passages are more important to the narrative than Peter-
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The critics of the anti-Masonic thesis also point out that the Book of 
Mormon’s secret combinations exhibit features absent from anti-
Masonic rhetoric.¹⁰ For example, Blake Ostler has argued that “the 
Book of Mormon secret societies diﬀer from Masons in the precise 
ways they are similar to ancient Near Eastern bands of robbers.”¹¹ In 
addition, critics of the thesis argue that certain key features of anti-
Masonic rhetoric are absent from the Book of Mormon’s discussions 
of Gadianton robbers. For example, Quinn argues that a stock element 
of the anti-Masonic furor of the 1820s was a denial that Masonry had 
any ancient origins.¹² In contrast, even the opponents of secret com-
binations within the Book of Mormon narrative acknowledge their 
ancient roots (see 2 Nephi 26:22; Alma 37:21–30; 3 Nephi 3:9). 
The argument over the anti-Masonic thesis is multifaceted, involv-
ing as it does attempts to ﬁnd or refute parallels between two complex 
phenomena. In his most recent work on the subject, Vogel claims to 
“respond to all of the major and most, if not all, of the minor argu-
ments against the anti-Masonic thesis.”¹³ He then goes on to discuss 
no less than seventeen speciﬁc subdisputes.¹⁴ A comprehensive dis-
cussion of the debate is beyond the scope of this paper. I will not sur-
vey the full range of arguments oﬀered for or against the anti-Masonic 
thesis, nor will I attempt to lay the issue to rest.¹⁵ Instead, I will focus 
on one possible line of analysis of a single issue within the debate.
son claims. However, Brown also holds that rather than being a Masonic reference, the 
lambskins in the Book of Mormon may have connections with ritual clothing that was 
worn in ancient Israel, Egypt, and Mesoamerica. 
 10. See, for example, Ostler, “Book of Mormon as a Modern Expansion,” 73–76.
 11. Ibid., 74. While Ostler rejects a crude version of the anti-Masonic thesis and re-
gards the Book of Mormon as at least in part an authentic ancient text, he believes that 
anti-Masonic rhetoric had some inﬂuence on the Book of Mormon. He writes: “[Certain 
passages about secret combinations] appear to be inﬂuenced by anti-Masonic terminol-
ogy and concerns. They may be explained best, it seems to me, as Joseph Smith’s inde-
pendent commentary on Masonry, sparked by his reﬂection on Nephite secret combina-
tions.” Ibid., 76. 
 12. Quinn, Early Mormonism and the Magic World View, 203.
 13. Vogel, “Echoes of Anti-Masonry,” 277.
 14. See ibid., 277–305.
 15. Participants on both sides have claimed that the debate has been decisively set-
tled. Compare William J. Hamblin, “An Apologist for the Critics: Brent Lee Metcalfe’s 
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One claim made by the proponents of the anti-Masonic thesis is 
that during the late 1820s the term secret combination had a unique 
and nearly exclusive association with Masonry. Vogel claims that “after 
extensive reading in the primary pre-1830 sources” he was “unable to 
ﬁnd another use for the term and doubted that one would be found.”¹⁶ 
It is, of course, undisputed that the term secret combination was used 
in the late 1820s to refer to Masonry.¹⁷ What critics of the anti-Masonic 
thesis question is whether or not it had an exclusively Masonic mean-
ing.¹⁸ I hope to throw light on this question by examining the use of 
the phrase secret combination in legal materials both from before the 
publication of the Book of Mormon and from the subsequent period 
of Joseph Smith’s lifetime. This approach has been taken and criticized 
before.¹⁹ However, I hope to show that previous attempts to use legal 
materials have been incomplete and in some ways mistaken. I also 
seek to respond to the claim that such legal materials are irrelevant to 
the anti-Masonic thesis. I conclude that the phrase secret combination 
did not have an exclusively anti-Masonic meaning either before or af-
ter the publication of the Book of Mormon and that, on the contrary, 
it was a term used to discuss hidden, criminal conspiracies.
Assumptions and Methodologies,” Review of Books on the Book of Mormon 6/1 (1994): 
499–500 (which states that Daniel Peterson’s work had deﬁnitively laid the anti-Masonic 
thesis to rest) with Vogel, “Echoes of Anti-Masonry,” 275 (which states that the truth of 
the anti-Masonic thesis has “long [been] regarded as obvious”). I will take the fact that 
ink continues to be spilled after more than 170 years as evidence that the question re-
mains open to fruitful discussion.
 16. Vogel, “Echoes of Anti-Masonry,” 318 n. 75. Compare with Peterson, “ ‘Secret Combi-
nations’ Revisited,” Journal of Book of Mormon Studies 1 (1992): 184, 185 n. 5. Peterson writes, 
“On 26 August 1989, Vogel and his sometime coauthor Brent Metcalfe, in a Salt Lake City 
conversation with me and my colleague, Prof. Stephen D. Ricks, declared ﬂatly that the phrase 
‘secret combination’ was never used at the time of the translation and publication of the Book 
of Mormon, except to refer to Freemasonry.” Ibid., 185 n. 5. 
 17. Dan Vogel, as quoted in Peterson, “ ‘Secret Combinations’ Revisited,” 184. 
 18. See Peterson, “Notes on ‘Gadianton Masonry,’ ” 189–97; Quinn, Early Mormon-
ism and the Magic World View, 511–12 n. 216.
 19. See Peterson, “Notes on ‘Gadianton Masonry,’ ” 191–93; and Vogel, “Echoes of Anti-
Masonry,” 300–301.
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Background
In 1826, Captain William Morgan, a resident of Canandaigua, a 
town a short distance from Palmyra, New York, prepared to publish 
an exposé of secret Masonic rituals after quarreling with members of 
his Masonic lodge.²⁰ However, he never printed his tell-all account. 
In September of that year, he disappeared near Niagara, and it was 
almost universally believed that he had been murdered by vengeful 
Masons. When those indicted for the murder were either acquitted or 
received light sentences, there was a wave of anti-Masonic agitation in 
response. New York State saw repeated conventions, mass meetings, 
and newspaper articles denouncing Masonry as a threat to the Repub-
lic and a criminal fraternity bent on protecting its own. In particular, 
people were outraged at the perceived inﬁltration and perversion of 
the legal system by Masons in the Morgan case.²¹ The epicenter of all 
this activity was just a few miles from Joseph Smith’s home in Palmyra. 
Anti-Masonry even became, for a short time, a national political issue 
in the late 1820s and early 1830s.²² Anti-Masons repeatedly referred to 
Masonry as a “secret combination.”²³ Proponents of the anti-Masonic 
thesis have pointed to this phrase as one piece of evidence supporting 
their argument, claiming that the term was so closely tied with Ma-
sonry as to constitute an intentional reference.²⁴ 
In order to eﬀectively criticize the claim that the phrase secret 
combination refers exclusively to Masonry, Quinn has argued that 
“it is necessary to ﬁnd someone (preferably a non-Mason) using the 
phrase ‘secret combination’ in a non-Masonic context before the 
. . . murder of William Morgan in 1826.”²⁵ Peterson has found one 
1826 reference to “secret combination” that is arguably outside of the 
 20. See Allen E. Roberts, Freemasonry in American History (Richmond, VA: Macoy 
and Masonic Supply, 1985), 228–29.
 21. Vogel, “Mormonism’s ‘Anti-Masonick Bible,’ ” 21. 
 22. Ibid., 19–21.
 23. See, for example, ibid., 22.
 24. Vogel, “Echoes of Anti-Masonry,” 300.
 25. Quinn, Early Mormonism and the Magic World View, 511 n. 216.
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context of anti-Masonry.²⁶ On 15 December 1826, Andrew Jackson 
wrote a letter to Sam Houston, attacking his long-time political op-
ponent Henry Clay.²⁷ In it, he accused Clay of “secrete [sic] combina-
tions of base slander” to smear Jackson’s wife in the press.²⁸ Peterson 
has pointed to this letter as an instance of a non-Masonic context in 
which the phrase secret combination was used.²⁹ Quinn has criticized 
this conclusion.³⁰ According to Quinn, Jackson was an active Mason 
attacking Clay, a lapsed Mason.³¹ He thus speculates that Jackson 
may have been using the phrase secret combination as a sarcastic dig 
at Clay.³² Although there is no direct evidence that Jackson meant 
the term to convey any Masonic subtext, Vogel refers to Quinn’s 
argument appreciatively.³³ He also states that “regardless, the term 
‘secret combination’ did not take on its full anti-Masonic meaning 
until 1827–28.”³⁴ This is a strangely inconsistent addition to Quinn’s 
analysis since Vogel seems, in eﬀect, to argue that Jackson’s com-
ment was an ironic play on a common political phrase that would 
not become a common political phrase for another two years.
Looking at Legal Materials
Peterson has also looked at legal materials. In 1990, John W. 
Welch, a professor at Brigham Young University’s J. Reuben Clark Law 
School, conducted a computerized search of nineteenth-century legal 
materials for Peterson.³⁵ In his piece, Peterson noted the limitations of 
his research: “Unfortunately, . . . many states did not begin printing 
reports with any degree of comprehensiveness until midway through 
 26. Peterson, “ ‘Secret Combinations’ Revisited,” 186–87.
 27. Ibid.
 28. Ibid., 187.
 29. Ibid.
 30. Quinn, Early Mormonism and the Magic World View, 511–12 n. 216. 
 31. Ibid. But Peterson noted the connections of Jackson and Clay to Masonry in his 
article. See Peterson, “ ‘Secret Combinations’ Revisited,” 187 and 187 n. 11.
 32. Quinn, Early Mormonism and the Magic World View, 512 n. 216.
 33. Vogel, “Echoes of Anti-Masonry,” 301–2.
 34. Ibid., 302.
 35. Peterson, “Notes on ‘Gadianton Masonry,’ ” 219 n. 74.
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the nineteenth century, and a large number of the older opinions are 
not on computer since they are not of current legal interest.”³⁶
Nevertheless, Peterson located ten legal cases from the nine-
teenth century that used the phrase secret combination.³⁷ The earli-
est reported opinion he located was from 1850,³⁸ and all but one of 
the cases he cited were from federal courts, half of them being from 
the United States Supreme Court.³⁹ Although he does not mention 
it, the exclusively federal nature of the materials that Peterson seems 
to have examined is potentially signiﬁcant because during the nine-
teenth century, there was comparatively little federal law. The amount 
of federal criminal law was miniscule. Finally, very few criminal cases 
made their way to the U.S. Supreme Court.⁴⁰ Indeed, under the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789 in force during the lifetime of Joseph Smith, the U.S. 
Supreme Court lacked appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases,⁴¹ an 
important point since the term combination was often used to refer to 
conspiracy⁴²—one would expect it to appear more often in criminal 
matters. In 1990, Welch did not have extensive access to computerized 
versions of early nineteenth-century state opinions,⁴³ although at least 
partial federal coverage—mainly Supreme Court decisions—would 
 36. Ibid., 191–92.
 37. Ibid., 190–93. 
 38. The case is Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 57 U.S. 314 (1850); Peter-
son, “Notes on ‘Gadianton Masonry,’ ” 192.
 39. Peterson, “Notes on ‘Gadianton Masonry,’ ” 190–93.
 40. Today the Supreme Court’s docket always includes a contingent of criminal 
cases. However, most of these cases involve a federal constitutional challenge to a state 
criminal conviction. Prior to the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in the wake of 
the Civil War, none of the federal constitution’s rights for criminal defendants applied to 
state convictions. Even after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, it wasn’t until 
well into the twentieth century that the Supreme Court interpreted it as applying the Bill 
of Rights to the states.
 41. Richard H. Fallon Jr., Daniel J. Meltzer, and David L. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s 
The Federal Courts and the Federal System, 5th ed. (Westbury, NY: Foundation, 2003), 32. 
The Supreme Court could take jurisdiction in criminal cases by issuing a writ of habeas 
corpus, although this was extremely rare. Ibid.
 42. Peterson, “Notes on ‘Gadianton Masonry,’ ” 189.
 43. John W. Welch, memorandum to Daniel Peterson, 18 September 1989 (copy in 
my possession) (“a lot of the older opinions are not on computer”).
56 •  The FARMS Review 16/1 (2004)
have extended into the eighteenth century. Thus, the legal universe 
that Peterson’s research covered was severely constrained, and his re-
sults were understandably inconclusive.
In his book Digging in Cumorah, Mark Thomas also examines 
early legal materials as a potential source for alternate uses of “se-
cret combination.”⁴⁴ He concludes that “Peterson’s hypothesis that 
‘secret combinations’ is a vague, generalized symbol with no speciﬁc 
referent cannot be substantiated by the very legal documents where 
he suggests that evidence will be found.”⁴⁵ Unfortunately, Thomas’s 
examination of legal sources is too narrow to be of any real value. 
Apparently taken with Peterson’s discussion of labor disputes and 
the possible connection of the phrase secret combination with early 
labor unions, Thomas turned his attention exclusively to six early 
nineteenth-century cases dealing with striking workers.⁴⁶ Thomas 
claims that Peterson “is certain that an examination of precedent-
setting cases of labor unions (‘combinations’) will support his broad 
interpretation that excludes Masonry.”⁴⁷ While Peterson does discuss 
unions, the late nineteenth-century cases he cites deal with a vari-
ety of subjects.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, Thomas’s research is limited to labor 
cases. This choice is puzzling. The proto-unionists that Thomas dis-
cusses were prosecuted under the common law of conspiracy. The 
labor cases simply use the term combination to refer to the agreement 
necessary to form the conspiracy. There is nothing special about its 
application to labor unions. Once this point is understood, Thomas’s 
choice to limit his research to labor disputes makes little sense. What 
is more, since labor cases formed only a miniscule fraction of all early 
nineteenth-century litigation,⁴⁹ the fact that the phrase secret combi-
 44. Mark D. Thomas, Digging in Cumorah: Reclaiming Book of Mormon Narratives 
(Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 1999), 209–12.
 45. Ibid., 212.
 46. Ibid., 210–11. 
 47. Ibid., 210. 
 48. See Peterson, “Notes on ‘Gadianton Masonry,’ ” 191–93.
 49. Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 2nd ed. (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1985), 553: “The labor problem . . . was practically speaking of major legal 
importance only after the Civil War.”
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nation does not occur in a sample of those cases has limited signiﬁ-
cance since the vast majority of nineteenth-century cases involving 
combinations of any kind had nothing to do with labor unions. For 
example, I was able to locate only one appellate case from anywhere 
in the United States before 1826 involving labor unions and the word 
combination,⁵⁰ yet during just the period of the 1820s, the supreme 
court of New York alone used the term in over thirty cases.⁵¹
Combinations and Secret Combinations in Early Judicial Opinions
Since Peterson made the ﬁrst foray into legal materials in search of 
secret combinations more than a decade ago, the availability of early 
judicial opinions in computerized format has dramatically expanded. 
It is now possible to search the decisions of many state and federal 
courts from the closing decades of the eighteenth and early decades 
of the nineteenth centuries. However, there are still reasons to be cau-
tious about the results of such searches. First, coverage remains very 
incomplete both because not all early case reporters are available in 
computerized format and because coverage of cases in the early re-
porters themselves is very incomplete.⁵²
Second, the vast majority of the available cases come from appel-
late courts, which fact distorts any searches in a variety of ways. Ap-
pellate decisions make up only a small fraction of all litigation. Judges 
decide most cases without any published opinion, and this was more 
markedly the case in the early nineteenth century than today. Most 
cases are never appealed. Furthermore, the cases in the appellate re-
ports tend to be exceptional. This does not mean that they were the 
high-proﬁle cases of the time, although sometimes they were. Rather 
 50. People v. Melvin, Yates Selected Cases 112 (N.Y.Sup. 1809) (involving an at-
tempted strike by cordwainers).
 51. On 19 July 2002 I ran the search “DA(BEF 01/01/1830 & AFT 01/01/1820) & 
COMBINATION!” in the NY-CS database on Westlaw, which for this period includes re-
ports from the state supreme court and the chancery court. The search produced thirty-
four opinions. Note that during the early nineteenth century the high court of New York 
was called the supreme court, as opposed to the court of appeals, as it is now known.
 52. Friedman, History of American Law, 322–25.
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it means that they have a diﬀerent character than most litigation. Gen-
erally cases turn on questions of fact. “Did John actually steal Abner’s 
cow?” However, appellate cases generally turn on issues of law. “Can 
multiple defendants be joined in a single suit at equity?” Although the 
categories of law and fact were more ﬂuid in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, appellate cases from the period still tend to contain involved legal 
discussion. This does not mean that the cases were exclusively technical 
or that they were devoid of discussion of events. On the contrary, they 
often provide fascinating windows into bits of late eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century life. However, in evaluating the virtues and the 
limitations of searching such materials, it is important to remember 
that we are looking at a narrow and, in some ways, unrepresentative 
slice of the legal past. 
Webster’s 1828 dictionary deﬁnes the word combination as an
Intimate union, or association of two or more persons or 
things, by set purpose or agreement, for eﬀecting some object, 
by joint operation; in a good sense, when the object is laudable; 
in an ill sense, when it is illegal or iniquitous. It is sometimes 
equivalent to league, or to conspiracy. We say a combination 
of men to overthrow government, or a combination to resist 
oppression.⁵³
It is generally acknowledged that combination was a widely used 
word in the 1820s. Certainly, a review of judicial opinions from 
the period bears this out. For example, a search of pre-1826 legal 
opinions reveals that the term combination was used in conjunction 
with conspiracy or fraud in more than 150 cases.⁵⁴ Thus the New 
 53. Quoted in Peterson, “Notes on ‘Gadianton Masonry,’ ” 189, emphasis in original.
 54. On 18 July 2002, a search of the Westlaw ALLCASES-OLD database using the 
search term “DA(BEF 01/01/1826) & COMBINATION! /S (FRAUD! CONSPIRI!)” pro-
duced 154 opinions. This search would produce all cases in the database from before 
1 January 1826 in which any permutation of the word combination appeared in the same 
sentence with any permutation of the words fraud or conspiracy. Thus the search included 
terms such as conspiracies, conspirator, conspirators, frauds, fraudulent, fraudulently, and 
so forth. 
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York Supreme Court wrote in 1823 of a “case of a combination or 
conspiracy,”⁵⁵ and the high court of Maryland in 1821 referred to a 
statute that “declaring . . . to be conspirators, [those] who should be 
engaged in certain combinations, subjected them to the law of con-
spiracy as it then existed.”⁵⁶ The most common formulation seems to 
have been fraudulent combination. For example, during the period 
from 1820 to 1823 alone, there were twelve cases in the high court of 
Joseph Smith’s New York containing that phrase.⁵⁷
The word combination also seems to have had connotations of se-
crecy. First, as already noted, there is its ubiquitous association with 
fraud, which always carries with it such connotations. In addition, 
combination was frequently used as though it were synonymous with 
secret agreement. For example, the supreme court of Pennsylvania, 
writing in 1810, while summarizing the Roman law of fraud for its 
common law readers, noted “that fraud, according to the understand-
ing of civilians, consisted in combination and secrecy, beneﬁt to our-
selves, and injury to others.”⁵⁸ In another fraud case decided in the 
same year, the same court used the term secret contract as a synonym 
for combination.⁵⁹ The cases also frequently laid emphasis on the se-
crecy in which combinations conduct their aﬀairs. Thus, in an 1820 
 55. McDonald v. Neilson, 2 Cow. 139, 179 (N.Y.Sup. 1823). For direct quotations from 
court decisions, the ﬁrst number represents the opening page of the decision, and the 
second represents the cited page number. Occasionally, I was unable to determine the 
exact pagination from the electronic versions I used.
 56. State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317, 334 (Md. 1821).
 57. See McDonald v. Neilson, 2 Cow. 139 (N.Y. 1823); James v. Morey, 2 Cow. 246 
(N.Y. 1823); Clark v. Henry, 2 Cow. 324 (N.Y. 1823); Henry v. Davis & Clark, 7 Johns.Ch. 
40 (N.Y.Ch. 1823); Bacon v. Bronson, 7 Johns.Ch. 194 (N.Y.Ch. 1823); Hadden v. Spader, 
20 Johns. 554 (N.Y. 1822); Slee v. Bloom, 20 Johns. 669 (N.Y. 1822); Neilson v. McDonald, 
6 Johns.Ch. 201 (N.Y.Ch. 1822); Star v. Ellis, 6 Johns.Ch. 393 (N.Y.Ch. 1822); Tiernan v. 
Wilson, 6 Johns.Ch. 411 (N.Y.Ch. 1822); Slee v. Bloom, 5 Johns.Ch. 366 (N.Y.Ch. 1821); 
and Myers v. Bradford, 4 Johns.Ch. 434 (N.Y.Ch. 1820). Note that this list includes cases 
from both the highest state law court and the highest state court of equity, which prior to 
1848 were separate. In Joseph Smith’s day, law and equity still occupied diﬀerent courts 
in the New York system. 
 58. Cheriot v. Foussat, 3 Binn. 220 (Pa. 1810).
 59. Lazarus v. Bryson, 3 Binn. 54, 58 (Pa. 1810).
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salvage case, the court discussed the way in which the law created 
incentives to avoid “combination[s] to secrete” shipwrecked valuables 
and referred to such combinations as an example of “covert malversa-
tion [“corrupt administration”].”⁶⁰ Likewise an early Kentucky case 
speaks of the land transfers “secretly made” by a “fraudulent com-
bination.”⁶¹ In 1799, the Maryland Chancery, in a case involving the 
various ﬁnancial misdeeds of an insolvent debtor, spoke of the “secret 
act” of a “fraudulent combination” directed at his creditors.⁶² Perhaps 
the most bizarre case that I located was decided by the Connecticut 
Superior Court in 1793. The case involved a slander lawsuit in which 
the plaintiﬀ alleged that the defendants falsely accused him of com-
plicity in rape in order to “cover the shame” of the supposed rape vic-
tim. In its opinion, the court discusses the alleged “wicked combina-
tion” and its relationship to the “secret assault on the body of Marcia 
Maples.”⁶³ 
Broadening the review to include cases from after the outbreak 
of anti-Masonic agitation but still within the lifetime of Joseph Smith 
reveals the same patterns of use. Four years after the publication of 
the Book of Mormon, in one of the ubiquitous cases involving shady 
land deals, the supreme court of Virginia discussed a “secret under-
standing and a combination” between real estate speculators.⁶⁴ A year 
earlier a Kentucky court heard a case regarding “the combination . . . 
to secrete” debt from creditors.⁶⁵ An opinion written by the Illinois 
Supreme Court during the period Joseph Smith resided in the state 
speaks of a crooked attorney who, “secretly combining” with another 
against his client, formed a “corrupt combination.”⁶⁶ A Missouri case 
from 1840, in discussing litigation regarding real estate transactions, 
 60. Hollingsworth v. Seventy Doubloons & Three Small Pieces of Gold, 12 F.Cas. 380, 
381 (D.C.Pa. 1820).
 61. Bradley v. Buford, 2 Ky. 12, 12 (Ky.App. 1801).
 62. Cheston v. Page’s Executors & Devisees, 4 H. & McH. 466, 480 (Md.Chan. 1799).
 63. Monroe v. Maples, 1 Root 553, 553 (Conn.Super. 1793).
 64. Spengler v. Snapp, 32 Va. 478, 487 (1834).
 65. Bibb v. Smith, 31 Ky. 580, 581 (Ky.App. 1833). The words omitted by the ellipses 
are “between Smith and Allen.”
 66. Frisby v. Ballance, 5 Ill. 287, 298 (1843).
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mentions a “combination” between speculators and “other persons to 
secrete” deeds to land.⁶⁷
These cases suggest three things. First, in the period prior to the 
anti-Masonic outcry of the late 1820s, combination was widely used 
and had a richer meaning than simply conspiracy or agreement. It 
could also carry strong overtones of secrecy, deception, and covert-
ness. Second, combination was not a term speciﬁc to any one branch 
of activity. The opinions speak with equal ease about combinations to 
take abandoned shipwrecks and combinations to avoid debt. Third, 
the anti-Masonic rhetoric of the 1820s does not seem to have had any 
eﬀect on the general use of the term. Judging by the judicial materials, 
the term has absolutely no association with Masonry either before or 
after Morgan’s 1826 disappearance. Nothing indicates that the term 
carried any Masonic subtext in later cases. Given this background 
meaning, combination was a natural choice for anti-Masons seeking 
an epitaph with which to label the objects of their propaganda. How-
ever, the same background meaning also provides a plausible explana-
tion of why in translating the Book of Mormon Joseph Smith would 
have chosen the word to describe the Gadianton robbers.
Although both Masons and Gadiantons were referred to simply 
as a “combination” (see Helaman 2:8; Ether 8:18), the disputed phrase 
in the controversy over the anti-Masonic thesis is secret combination. 
However, this phrase also appears repeatedly in judicial opinions 
from the period. I was able to locate two cases from before 1826 us-
ing the precise term. In addition several cases from after the publica-
tion of the Book of Mormon use the term in substantially the same 
way as the pre-1826 cases. This in turn suggests that, contrary to what 
proponents of the anti-Masonic thesis have implied, the anti-Masonic 
uproar of the 1820s did not dramatically change the meaning or usage 
of the term, although any such claim must be qualiﬁed by the conser-
vative nature of legal language.
The ﬁrst opinion using the term that I located was the case of Du-
val v. Burtis, decided by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in 1819.⁶⁸ The 
 67. Truesdell v. Callaway, 6 Mo. 605, 612 (1840).
 68. Duval v. Burtis, 9 Ky. 120 (Ky.App. 1819).
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case revolved around a confused set of transactions involving nego-
tiable instruments, cross-boarder attachments of property, lawsuits in 
two states, an attempt to assign the rights from one lawsuit to another, 
an alleged double- and triple-crossing assistant to a con man, and an 
expensive Kentucky horse named Porto. According to the plaintiﬀ, 
the defendant had been in league with a shady character from Ten-
nessee who purchased Porto on credit and then left the state. In his 
response to the suit, the defendant denied that there was any “secret 
combination” between himself and the Tennessean. Although the 
case touches on a wide variety of issues in a comparatively short opin-
ion (two pages), one of the issues about which there is not even the 
slightest hint is Masonry. Absolutely nothing in the opinion suggests 
that the court is using the term secret combination to refer to anything 
other than a covert pact to steal a horse.
The second pre-1826 case that I located was much closer to the 
publication of the Book of Mormon in both time and space. In July 
1825, just fourteen months before Morgan’s disappearance in the same 
state, the supreme court of New York issued its opinion in Fellows v. 
Fellows.⁶⁹ This opinion is a much grander document than the brief 
ruling of the court in Duval v. Burris. Modeled on the early opinions 
of the House of Lords, it contains a lengthy summary of the case by 
the clerk of the court, excerpts from the speeches oﬀered by counsel 
during oral argument, and a string of separate opinions by the court’s 
judges. The case involved a bitter family dispute that stretched over 
more than a decade. Stripping away the complex ﬁnancial machina-
tions of all parties, the story is simple. A son, in order to sell real estate 
encumbered with various obligations, transferred title to his father, 
who was to hold the property in trust during the course of the sale, 
which was to extend over several years. The father, however, swindled 
his son, sold the property, and pocketed the proceeds. The son then 
died, and his widow obtained a judgment against the father. The fa-
ther, in a vain attempt to avoid the judgment, transferred his property 
to another son, who was to hold it in trust for him. The widow then 
brought a second suit against all her in-laws, arguing that the whole 
 69. Fellows v. Fellows, 4 Cow. 682 (N.Y.Sup. 1825).
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scheme was a fraud. In the case before the supreme court upholding 
her victory in the second lawsuit, the judges and attorneys used vari-
ous terms to describe the erring members of the Fellows clan. They 
were guilty of “combining and confederating.” They constituted a 
“fraudulent combination,” an “unlawful combination,” a “combina-
tion and confederacy,” and a “secret and fraudulent combination.” Fi-
nally, Justice Woodworth referred to them as a “fraudulent and secret 
combination.”
The Fellows case is especially instructive for two reasons. First, 
it provides a clear and obviously non-Masonic use of the term secret 
combination from the immediate vicinity of Joseph Smith that is al-
most contemporaneous with the outbreak of the anti-Masonic agita-
tion that is supposed to have inspired the Gadianton robbers. Second, 
the involved discussion of the various actors in the reported opinion 
and their frequent use of diﬀering phrases to describe the same crimi-
nal activity provide a marvelous study of how the phrase secret combi-
nation was understood in relation to other terms. What Fellows shows 
is that secret combination, far from being a bit of jargon newly coined 
for the exclusive use of anti-Masons in the late 1820s, ﬁts comfortably 
into a set of very common terms that had been used for decades to 
describe all kinds of criminal activities.
Furthermore, if we compare these cases with others using the 
term secret combination in the two decades after the publication of 
the Book of Mormon, we ﬁnd that the use and meaning of the term 
seems untouched by anti-Masonry and carries no new overtones. 
In 1833, members of the Tennessee Supreme Court considered a 
case in which they expressed concern about adopting a rule that 
would expose sureties to the risk of ruin at the hands of “secret 
combinations.”⁷⁰ Seven years later, a Kentucky court, in discussing 
“robbers, thieves, etc.,” suggested that those using common carri-
ers were exposed to a special risk from such “secret combinations.”⁷¹ 
 70. Wells v. Grant, 12 Tenn. 491, 494 (1833). Although the identity of the secret com-
binations is not clear, from context the court seems to have in mind combinations be-
tween debtors and creditors against sureties.
 71. Frankfort Bridge Company v. Williams, 39 Ky. 403, 405 (1840).
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Interestingly, this case used the term speciﬁcally to refer to con-
spiracies between legitimate businesses and outlaws on the high-
way, which is suggestive, given the Book of Mormon’s repeated ref-
erences to the Gadiantons as robbers (see Helaman 6:18; 3 Nephi 
1:27; 4 Nephi 1:17) and their sometime association with respectable 
elites (see Helaman 1–2).⁷² An 1843 case from South Carolina uses 
the phrase in a diﬀerent context. After the Bank of South Carolina 
suspended specie payments three times during the ﬁnancial panics 
of the 1830s, the state attorney general claimed that the bank had 
violated its charter and should be dissolved. A circuit court that 
ruled in the bank’s favor discussed the various legitimate reasons a 
bank might suspend specie payments. Among them it listed “secret 
combinations” of predatory foreign corporations.⁷³ These cases 
suggest that contrary to the position occasionally adopted by Quinn 
and Vogel,⁷⁴ one need not assume that every post-1826 reference to 
secret combinations carries an anti-Masonic subtext or has an anti-
Masonic rhetorical pedigree. Rather, the legal materials suggest 
that the phrase carried a fairly constant meaning both before and 
after the outbreak of anti-Masonic agitation. 
On Legalese
Vogel has questioned the usefulness of examining legal docu-
ments at all for understanding the language of the Book of Mormon. 
“Legalese,” he declares, “was not the language of Joseph Smith, nor 
 72. Indeed, John W. Welch has argued that the Book of Mormon’s choice of the word 
robbers to designate the Gadiantons draws on an ancient legal distinction between out-
law bands and mere thieves. See his “Theft and Robbery in the Book of Mormon and in 
Near Eastern Law” (FARMS paper, 1989). See also Thomas, Digging in Cumorah, 196, 
who argues that Gadianton robbers were identiﬁed with social elites.
 73. The circuit court’s opinion is included in the introductory notes to the intermediate 
court of appeals of South Carolina’s opinion in State v. The Bank of South Carolina, 1 Speers 
433 (S.C.Err. 1843). Because there was doubtless some time between the decision of the cir-
cuit court and the court of errors, the date of the circuit court may be earlier—for example, 
1842; however, it is undated.
 74. Quinn, Early Mormonism and the Magic World View, 511–12 n. 216; Vogel, “Echoes 
of Anti-Masonry,” 302.
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was it the language of his intended audience.”⁷⁵ There is some merit 
to this criticism. Certainly, lawyers have a well-deserved reputation 
for tortured prose, and as I indicated earlier, appellate cases such 
as those I have examined are more likely to be technical. Likewise, 
while Joseph Smith studied law later when he was serving as a judge 
in Nauvoo⁷⁶ and some of his revelations from that period use legal 
terms (see D&C 132:7),⁷⁷ there is no evidence that he had any exten-
sive familiarity with legal materials in the Palmyra period.⁷⁸ Nor is 
there any reason to suppose that the Book of Mormon is (generally 
speaking) written in technical legal language.⁷⁹
 75. Vogel, “Echoes of Anti-Masonry,” 301.
 76. See Scott H. Faulring, ed., An American Prophet’s Record: The Diaries and Jour-
nals of Joseph Smith (Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 1989), 321. See also Dallin H. Oaks, 
“The Suppression of the Nauvoo Expositor,” Utah Law Review 9 (1964–1965): 862, 875 
(which discusses Joseph Smith’s exposure to Blackstone’s Commentaries in Nauvoo City 
Council meetings). By the Nauvoo period, Joseph was deeply involved in quite complex 
civil litigation, and it is unlikely that he would have escaped familiarity with at least some 
technical legal terms. See Dallin H. Oaks and Joseph I. Bentley, “Joseph Smith and Legal 
Process: In the Wake of the Steamboat Nauvoo,” Brigham Young University Law Review 
1976/3 (1976): 735 (which discusses in depth Joseph Smith’s civil litigation in Nauvoo).
 77. Truman Madsen has noted: “Some of the verses [from section 132] describe the 
conditions of the everlasting covenant in such terms as an attorney might use who had 
spent days thinking up every possible synonym, nuance, and contingency so that no 
loophole would remain.” Truman G. Madsen, Joseph Smith the Prophet (Salt Lake City: 
Bookcraft, 1989), 22–23.
 78. However, it is worth noting in this regard that Joseph had had experience with 
the law by 1826. In that year he was charged with being a “ ‘disorderly person’ ” in con-
nection with money-digging activities in Pennsylvania. See Gordon A. Madsen, “Joseph 
Smith’s 1826 Trial: The Legal Setting,” BYU Studies 30/2 (1990): 91.
 79. John Welch, however, has noted the existence of legal materials and legal concepts 
in the Book of Mormon, although he identiﬁes elements of ancient Hebrew law, rather than 
early American jurisprudence. See John W. Welch, “Law and War in the Book of Mormon,” 
in Warfare in the Book of Mormon, ed. Stephen D. Ricks and William J. Hamblin (Salt 
Lake City: Deseret Book and FARMS, 1990), 46–102; John W. Welch, “Lehi’s Last Will 
and Testament: A Legal Approach,” in The Book of Mormon: Second Nephi, The Doctrinal 
Structure, ed. Monte S. Nyman and Charles D. Tate Jr. (Provo, UT: BYU Religious Studies 
Center, 1989), 61–82; John W. Welch, “Legal Perspectives on the Slaying of Laban,” Journal 
of Book of Mormon Studies 1 (1992): 119–41; John W. Welch, “Law in the Book of Mormon: 
The Nephite Court Cases” (FARMS paper, 1996); John W. Welch, “ ‘If a Man . . .’: The Casu-
istic Law Form in the Book of Mormon” (FARMS paper, 1987); John W. Welch, “Series of 
Laws in the Book of Mormon” (FARMS paper, 1987); John W. Welch, “Judicial Process in 
the Trial of Abinadi” (FARMS paper, 1981). 
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However, it would be unwise to overstate the force of this ar-
gument. Despite its reputation among lay people, legal language is 
not an impenetrable mass of exclusively technical jargon. Certainly, 
legal writing can be turgid, but much of it uses words in their ordi-
nary senses. To evaluate the strength of the “legalese” criticism, it 
is important to understand something about legal language. While 
we should be cautious in generalizing about ordinary language on 
the basis of legal materials, it is simplistic to assume that all judicial 
opinions can be dismissed as irrelevant “legalese.” Rather, attention 
to the way speciﬁc words are used and an appreciation for what is—
and is not—technical about legal language is needed.
Obviously, legal language contains many technical terms. These 
fall into essentially three diﬀerent categories. First, there are those 
words that are speciﬁc to the law itself. In Joseph Smith’s day most 
of these terms were drawn from the common law of England, which 
was inherited by Americans at the time of the Revolution. The ex-
clusively technical terms of this body of law, in turn, date back to 
the late medieval period and consist of a pastiche of Latin words and 
what is known as “law French.” Law French was a strange linguistic 
descendant of the medieval French spoken by the eleventh-century 
Norman conquerors of England. A mongrel language that reminded 
one modern legal scholar of “the taunting Frenchman from Monty 
Python and the Holy Grail,”⁸⁰ law French was the oﬃcial spoken lan-
guage of the English courts from about 1250 until about 1500, and 
it continued to be the language of written reports for about another 
 80. David Franklin, “Pardon My Law French,” Greenbag (Summer 1999): 421. This 
article contains the following example of seventeenth-century law French, which gives 
one some sense of its bizarre quality: “Richardson Chief Justice de Common Banc al as-
sises de Salisbury in Summer 1631 fuit assault per prisoner la condemne pur felony, que 
puis son condemnation ject un brickbat a le dit justice, que narrowly mist, et pur ceo im-
mediately fuit indictment drawn per Noy envers le prisoner et son dexter manus ampute 
et ﬁx al gibbet, sur que luy mesme immediatement hange in presence de Court.” Ibid. 
This kind of tortured language led one distraught French diplomat to write in the time of 
Elizabeth I that law French “may be worthily compared to some old ruines of some faire 
building, where so many brambles and thorns are grown, that scarecely it appeareth that 
ever there had bin any house.” Ibid.
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century thereafter.⁸¹ From it are drawn terms such as replevin,⁸² tro-
ver,⁸³ larceny,⁸⁴ and trespass.⁸⁵ Other technical terms such as habeas 
corpus,⁸⁶ assumpsit,⁸⁷ and nisi prius⁸⁸ are either Latin or have Latin 
roots. All of these terms are purely technical and have no English 
meaning outside of the common law. In the case of some of the 
words drawn from law French, they have no nonlegal meaning at 
all, having never been natural words in any tongue other than the 
unique language of the medieval English courts.
The second class of technical terms includes those words that have 
meanings in ordinary English but have substantially diﬀerent mean-
ings in the law. A classic example of this kind of term is the word mal-
ice. In ordinary speech malice has the connotation of malevolence and 
 81. Franklin, “Pardon My Law French,” 421.
 82. “An action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or 
chattels may recover those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully . . . taken 
[them].” Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (St. Paul, MN: West, 1990), 1299. For an ex-
ample, see Henderson v. Ballantine, 4 Cow. 549 (N.Y.Sup. 1825) (a New York case from 
Joseph Smith’s period that uses the term replevin).
 83. “In common-law practice, the action of trover . . . is a species of action on the case, 
and originally lay for the recovery of damages against a person who had found another’s 
goods and wrongfully converted them to his own use.” Black’s, 1508. For an example, see 
Ex Parte Ward, 5 Cow. 20 (N.Y.Sup. 1825) (a New York case from Joseph Smith’s period 
that uses the term trover).
 84. “Felonious stealing, taking and carrying, leading, riding, or driving away another’s 
personal property, with intent to convert it or to deprive [the] owner thereof.” Black’s, 881. 
For an example of such technical language, see Mills v. McCoy, 4 Cow. 406 (N.Y.Sup. 1825) 
(a New York case from Joseph Smith’s period that uses the term larceny).
 85. “An unlawful interference with one’s person, property, or rights.” Black’s, 1502. 
For an example, see Hodges v. Chace, 2 Wend. 248 (N.Y.Sup. 1829) (a New York case from 
Joseph Smith’s period that uses the term trespass).
 86. “The name given to a variety of writs . . . having for their object to bring a party 
before a court or judge.” Black’s, 709. For an example, see Ex parte Tayloe, 5 Cow. 39 
(N.Y.Sup. 1825) (a New York case from Joseph Smith’s period that uses the term habeas 
corpus).
 87. “A promise or engagement by which one person assumes or undertakes to do 
some act or pay something to another.” Black’s, 122. For an example, see Gourley v. Allen, 
5 Cow. 644 (N.Y.Sup. 1825) (a New York case from Joseph Smith’s day that uses the term 
assumpsit).
 88. “The nisi prius courts are such as are held for the trial of issues of fact before a jury 
and one presiding judge.” Black’s, 1047. For an example, see Flower v. Allen, 5 Cow. 654 
(N.Y.Sup. 1825) (a New York case from Joseph Smith’s period using the term nisi prius).
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conscious ill will. In the common law, however, malice is an element 
of the crime of murder—famously deﬁned as “the unlawful killing of 
any reasonable creature in being with malice aforethought”⁸⁹—and 
has a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent meaning. Malice speciﬁcally refers to the 
state of mind necessary for a homicide to become a murder. Generally, 
this has been understood at a minimum as knowledge that the actions 
one is engaged in will result in the death of another. What has been 
universally agreed is that subjective ill will is not a necessary compo-
nent of the legal concept of malice. Thus, the loving child who poisons 
her dying mother in order to ease her suﬀering from a terminal illness 
has acted with “malice” under the law, regardless of her subjective al-
truism. However, the man who, in a ﬁt of rage, insults his worst enemy 
who then, as a result of a rare disease, dies of a heart attack has not 
acted with “malice,” despite his hatred and ill will.
Third, there are those terms that have substantially the same 
meaning in ordinary English and in the law but which the law deﬁnes 
with greater precision. For example, in ordinary speech the word as-
sault means “to attack.” In the law, it has essentially the same meaning 
but is reﬁned with greater precision. An assault is an action by one 
person that causes another person to have a reasonable fear of serious 
bodily injury. Thus a man who takes a swing at his wife’s face with a 
baseball bat has assaulted her in both the ordinary and legal sense of 
the word. On the other hand, a toddler who kicks an NFL linebacker 
has not committed an assault because while he attacks the linebacker, 
any fear of serious bodily injury that the linebacker might have is not 
reasonable. Likewise, a man who brandishes a machete threateningly 
over his victim’s head has not assaulted him if the victim is looking 
the other way. This is because the victim’s ignorance of the machete 
means that it cannot cause him to have any fear of bodily injury at 
all. Such examples of precise deﬁnitions that substantially track ordi-
nary speech but that occasionally produce anomalous results could be 
multiplied endlessly. For example, the technical deﬁnition of murder 
given in the preceding paragraph falls into this category.
 89. The deﬁnition is attributed to the great seventeenth-century chief justice Sir Ed-
ward Coke.
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Armed with this more nuanced understanding of the technical-
ity of legal language, it is possible to better appreciate the usefulness 
of early judicial opinions for evaluating the anti-Masonic thesis. The 
phrases combination and secret combination do not seem to fall into 
any of these classes of technical “legalese.” Combination was not a 
speciﬁcally legal term of art such as words drawn from Latin or law 
French. Nor does it seem to have had a technical meaning in either of 
the two ways explained above. 
Perhaps signiﬁcantly, none of the cases that I reviewed involved 
jury instructions regarding the meaning of the word combination, 
which further strengthens the claim that the word was not being used 
in a technical sense. In instructing juries, judges often provide expla-
nations of technical legal terms. I qualify the signiﬁcance of this ab-
sence for two reasons. First, the coverage of published opinions dur-
ing this era is incomplete.⁹⁰ Second, prior to the American Revolution, 
juries enjoyed a great deal of autonomy and were relatively free from 
strict judicial oversight.⁹¹ In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, however, this changed as judges began to “rein in” juries 
with, among other things, more technical instructions.⁹² Juries in the 
1820s still enjoyed a greater amount of autonomy than do modern ju-
ries. Thus even though judges were seeking to more tightly control ju-
ries, we should expect fewer cases involving jury instructions than we 
see today. Nevertheless, New York opinions from before 1826 included 
discussion of jury instructions related to trespass on the case,⁹³ lar-
ceny,⁹⁴ and the distinction between theft and ordinary trespass.⁹⁵ It is 
thus not unreasonable to expect that there would be jury instructions 
deﬁning combination if it were in fact a technical term. The absence of 
 90. Friedman, History of American Law, 322–25.
 91. Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780–1860 (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 28.
 92. Ibid., 141–43.
 93. See Merritt v. Brinkerhoﬀ, 17 Johns. 306 (N.Y.Sup. 1820) (which discusses the 
rights and duties of a mill owner vis-à-vis downstream users of the millstream).
 94. People v. Anderson, 14 Johns. 294 (N.Y.Sup. 1817) (which discusses what must be 
found by the jury in order to hold the accused guilty).
 95. Dexter v. Taber, 12 Johns. 239 (N.Y.Sup. 1815) (which discusses the distinction 
between theft and trespass in the context of an allegedly slanderous accusation).
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such instructions is suggestive. All of this points to the conclusion that, 
contrary to what some have suggested,⁹⁶ combination and secret combi-
nation were not technical legal terms in the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth 
century. They were used in legal opinions, but they were not “legalese.” 
Rather they were similar to terms such as trade,⁹⁷ business, or liveli-
hood⁹⁸ that appeared in legal opinions without taking on any special 
legal meaning. Far from being “irrelevant” for understanding normal 
language, such nontechnical legal materials can provide us with valid 
samples of how common words and phrases were understood.
Limitations, Implications, and Conclusions
Legal materials suggest that contrary to the claims of propo-
nents of the anti-Masonic thesis, the term secret combination did not 
have an exclusively anti-Masonic meaning. Rather it seems to have 
been used as a general term to refer to hidden criminal agreements 
and conspiracies. It was used this way prior to the disappearance of 
Captain Morgan and continued to be used in the same way after the 
outbreak of anti-Masonic agitation. The continuity of meaning in 
the legal opinions suggests that those who see in every post-1826 use 
of the term an anti-Masonic subtext are probably overplaying the 
linguistic inﬂuence of anti-Masonry. Rather, in the absence of spe-
ciﬁc evidence linking a use of the term to anti-Masonry, the best way 
of reading post-1826 uses of secret combination is probably to sim-
ply look at their contexts and take the plain meaning at face value. 
Admittedly, there are more post-1826 occurrences of the term than 
pre-1826 occurrences in the legal materials. It might be tempting 
to attribute this increase to the inﬂuence of anti-Masonic rhetoric. 
However, it is probably a mistake to do so. A more likely explanation 
 96. For example, Vogel argues, “It is irrelevant what the phrase ‘secret combinations’ 
meant in technical language at the time, even if it did have a separate legal deﬁnition.” 
Vogel, “Echoes of Anti-Masonry,” 301. 
 97. See, for example, Smith v. Lusher, 5 Cow. 688 (N.Y.Sup. 1825) (referring to “part-
ners in trade”).
 98. See, for example, Seymour v. Ellison, 2 Cow. 13 (N.Y.Sup. 1823): “His business was 
. . . very limited; aﬀording him but a scanty livelihood.”
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is simply that there were more judicial opinions as the century pro-
gressed. As the American population and the American economy 
grew during the ﬁrst half of the century, the amount of litigation 
increased accordingly. In addition, as the century progressed, the 
publication of judicial opinions became more regular and compre-
hensive. The inﬂuence of anti-Masonry as an explanation is simply 
dwarfed in comparison to the explosion in the volume of published 
opinions during the nineteenth century.⁹⁹
Still, it is important to understand the limitations of legal ma-
terials. Judicial opinions tell us something about the way in which 
language was understood at diﬀerent periods of time. However, the 
meaning of the phrase secret combination is only one part—and not 
the most important part—of the debate over the anti-Masonic thesis. 
Obviously, analysis of legal materials is not the same thing as analysis 
of the Book of Mormon, and an interpretation of the phrase secret com-
bination is not the same thing as an interpretation of the Gadianton 
robbers. These are important issues, but they are clearly beyond the 
scope of this paper. Likewise, legal materials can be technical. Their 
use will require a nuanced sense of when it is—and is not—possible to 
generalize based on legal writings.
It is also important to understand how narrow the scope of mate-
rials covered by even my comparatively comprehensive search is. The 
reported decisions of the appellate courts from the early nineteenth 
century form a very small part of the legal universe. Legal language, in 
turn, forms only a narrow part of all language. The narrowness of my 
research cuts both ways. Proponents of the anti-Masonic thesis can 
point out that a review of such materials does not constitute extensive 
reading in the primary pre-1830 sources.¹⁰⁰ On the other hand, the 
repeated appearance of the phrase secret combinations in such a nar-
row slice of language also suggests that its use may have been much 
more widespread.
 99. See, for example, Friedman, History of American Law, 409 (which discusses the 
rise of the West’s reporter system).
 100. Vogel, “Echoes of Anti-Masonry,” 301.
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Finally, it is important to understand the way in which previous 
discussions of legal materials in the context of the anti-Masonic thesis 
have been mistaken. Neither combination nor secret combination were 
technical legal terms. Their use was not conﬁned to any one area of the 
law. It is thus a mistake to expect to ﬁnd them especially concentrated 
in one kind of litigation. It is also a mistake to assume that their use 
in judicial opinions would have been unintelligible or foreign to lay 
people. Nor should we expect to ﬁnd some alternate exclusive use of 
the term. Thus, while the anti-Masonic thesis posits that secret com-
bination was a term with an exclusively (or nearly exclusively) anti-
Masonic meaning, in using legal materials to criticize the thesis, it is a 
mistake to go looking for an alternative exclusive meaning, whether it 
be describing labor unions or guerrilla ﬁghters.
Ultimately, I think that the issue of the term secret combination 
and the anti-Masonic thesis comes down to a choice between two 
options. First is the claim that secret combination carried such an 
exclusively anti-Masonic meaning that its use in the Book of Mormon, 
especially with regard to latter-day prophecies, was a direct and inten-
tional reference to Masonry.¹⁰¹ This position depends on the exclusiv-
ity and uniqueness of the anti-Masonic use of the term. The second 
position is that the term had a broader meaning and cannot be read as 
a simple reference to Masonry. This position does not involve a denial 
that anti-Masonry may have changed the connotation of the term in 
some contexts or that anti-Masonic uses of the phrase are useful in 
understanding the original language of the Book of Mormon transla-
tion. However, it does involve the claim that secret combination had a 
broader meaning than that attributed to it by proponents of the anti-
Masonic thesis. I believe that the legal materials discussed in this paper 
 101. Interestingly, Vogel’s earlier treatment of anti-Masonic readings of the Book of 
Mormon is considerably more tentative and less strident than his later response to crit-
ics. In 1989, he wrote, “Right or wrong, it’s certain that Martin Harris and other early 
readers held anti-Masonic interpretations of the Book of Mormon’s contents. How deep 
these went is not entirely clear.” Vogel, “Mormonism’s ‘Anti-Masonick Bible,’ ” 28. In 
2002, although he oﬀers substantially the same evidence, Vogel wrote more certainly that 
“Joseph Smith was aware of the Masonic connotation, and his use of the phrase [secret 
combinations] was clearly intentional.” Vogel, “Echoes of Anti-Masonry,” 300.
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severely undermine the ﬁrst position and suggest that the phrase secret 
combination cannot be read as a simple reference to Masonry. On the 
contrary, judicial opinions from the early nineteenth century provide 
numerous, concrete examples of non-Masonic uses of the term.
